Initially, I wanted to write a review of Alexander Schnell's new book on Kant's A- and B-Deductions, Zeit, Einbildung, Ich. Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants 'Transzendentaler Kategorien-Deduktion' (Klostermann 2022), but instead of a proper review, here a few quick notes on his interesting reflections on the proof structures of the A-Deduction as well as the B-Deduction, one reason for scholars of Kant to investigate this book.
In general, I should like to note that, apart from an interesting account of the A-Deduction, there is nothing really that novel, or specifically 'phenomenological', about his reading (despite the subtitle), except for two chapters on Heidegger's reading of the A Deduction, and Eugen Fink on the Schematism. I found the account of the B-Deduction rather thin, to be honest. It certainly isn't a bad book, and it could serve as a good introduction to both versions of the Transcendental Deduction, as well as to Heidegger's reading.
That said, Schnell has an interesting twofold account of the so-called second step of the B-Deduction: first the application of the categories, in virtue of figurative synthesis, on the a priori form of time, which is then followed by an account of synthesis of apprehension of empirical intuitions. So §24 is, according to Schnell, an integral part of the second step-argument, not just §26, as most commentators believe and Kant himself (B144) seems to indicate.
Interestingly, Schnell sees the second step as the B-parallel of the A-edition's subjective deduction and the first step as the objective one, whereas Séguy-Duclot -- another very recent interpretation -- rather sees the first step as the equivalent of the subjective deduction (see Onof's and my review of Séguy-Duclot).
At the end of his book, Schnell has a handy 'schematic' presentation of all the deductions present in the Deduction: he counts 7 in total:
1. 1st objective Deduction (=§14)
2. 'Synthesen-Deduktion' (A95-114)
3. 'Deduktion von oben', as 2 + imagination
4. 'Deduktion von unten', as 3 + intellectualisation of imagination through pure apperception [both 3 & 4 are contained in Abschnitt III (A115-28)]
5. 2nd objective Deduction (A128-30)
6. The so-called 'first step' of the B-Deduction (=objective deduction), as 5 + functions of judgement
7. 'second step', the answer to the 'how'-question (=subjective deduction), which has two parts:
a. in relation to a priori intuition, with synthesis of productive imagination, production of 'Figürlichkeit' (§24)
b. in relation to empirical intuition, with synthesis of apprehension (§26)
While the precise location of the subjective and objective deductions in the A-Deduction remains subject of debate -- see below -- the attribution of these labels to the two steps of the B-Deduction is at least controversial. Schnell notes that Baum thinks the 1st step is the subjective deduction (as does Séguy-Duclot in his recent book, not mentioned by Schnell), and the 2nd step is the objective deduction.
Whereas there is near universal consensus on the proof structure of Kant's B-Deduction, there is none on the proof structure of the A-Deduction. Most would think that roughly the so-called subjective deduction is contained in Section II of the A-edition Transcendental Deduction (A95-114), and the objective deduction in Section III of the Deduction (A115–27/8). But Carl (1992) thinks that the objective deduction is contained merely in A92–3/4 in §14, i.e. in Section I of the Transcendental Deduction, and all of the rest, Sections II and III, is the subjective deduction. Bauer (2010) has, controversially, argued that the subjective and objective deductions are actually reversed! So Section II is the objective one, and Section III is the subjective one (see below).
Very recently, there has been an upsurge in interest in the A Deduction. De Boer's chapter on the A Deduction in her (2020) book argues that the subjective deduction is contained in A98-110, with the objective deduction already starting in Section II at A110, running till A128. Séguy-Duclot (2021) argues that the subjective deduction is spread over Sections II and III (A97–119), with the objective deduction first starting at A111 and then from the end of A119 (well into Section III) until the end of Section III. Corey Dyck (2022), who only considers the objective deduction, thinks that the objective deduction starts at A116 and ends at A123. Huaping Lu-Adler (2022) has an interesting take and argues that the subjective and objective deductions are 'intermingled throughout the A-Deduction'. Schnell (2022) argues, like Carl, that the objective deduction is contained in §14, from A92–4, but it's the 'first' objective deduction, whereas the summary at the end of the Deduction (A128-30) is a 'second' objective one, with all the rest being the subjective deduction. Now which is it?
As the A-Deduction wasn't part of my account in my book Kant's Deduction and Apperception (1st edition 2012), I didn't take a position in that debate. About Bauer's controversial reversal, I wrote the following on p. 279, note 15 (with a few more references added):
Bauer (2010) contends, against the standard reading, that section III of the A-Deduction contains the subjective deduction, and section II the objective one, and not vice versa. Although in the A-preface Kant seems to locate the objective deduction in A92–3, Bauer (2010: 454–5) states that this passage is merely programmatic and that the actual objective deduction is to be found in section II. While I am not sure about the textual tenability of locating the objective deduction in section II (since Kant does explicitly say, in the A-preface, that the ‘objective’ deduction is contained in the section at A92–3 and ‘should even be sufficient by itself’ [Axvii]), Bauer’s is a noteworthy take on the division of the A-Deduction that sheds a different light on the relation between the subjective and objective deductions. I find though that Bauer (2010: 451) underplays the systematic function of section III by stressing ‘its rhetorical strategy’, in order to ‘prevent a misunderstanding’ rather than to ‘establish a claim’. On the proof-structure of the A-Deduction, see also Carl (1992: 42–54). Carl (1992: 53–4) concludes that the objective deduction is to be found at A92–3, with some brief rehearsals at A96 and A111, and that the subjective deduction is contained in both section II (in its ‘vorläufige’ form) and section III (in its ‘systematische’ form). See also Erdmann (1878: 24–6), Baum (1986: 64ff.), Longuenesse (1998: 57), Motta (2007: 199ff.) and especially Dyck (2008: 175–8).
The jury is out on the exact proof structure of the A-Deduction.
References:
Bauer, N. (2010) ‘Kant’s Subjective Deduction’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18,3: 433–60.
Baum, M. (1986) Deduktion und Beweis in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie (Königstein/Ts: Athenäum).
Carl, W. (1992) Die transzendentale Deduktion der Kategorien in der ersten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Ein Kommentar (Frankfurt a/M: Klostermann). De Boer, K. (2020) Kant's Reform of Metaphysics. The 'Critique of Pure Reason' Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Dyck, C. (2008) ‘The Subjective Deduction and the Search for a Fundamental Force’, Kant-Studien 99,2: 152–79.
Dyck, C. (2022) 'The Proof-Structure of Kant’s A-Edition Objective Deduction', in: Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the Theory of Apperception: New Interpretations, edited by G. Motta, D. Schulting & U. Thiel (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter), pp. 381-402.
Erdmann, B. (1878) Kants Kriticismus in der ersten und in der zweiten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Leipzig: Leopold Voss).
Huaping-Adler, L. (2022) 'The Subjective Deduction and Kant’s Methodological Skepticism', in: Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the Theory of Apperception: New Interpretations, edited by G. Motta, D. Schulting & U. Thiel (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter), pp. 341–60.
Motta (2007) Kants Philosophie der Notwendigkeit (Frankfurt a/M: Peter Lang).
Schulting, D. (2012) Kant's Deduction and Apperception. Explaining the Categories (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
Séguy-Duclot, A. (2021) Kant, le premier cercle. La déduction transcendantale des catégories (1781 et 1787) (Paris: Classiques Garnier).
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